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The franchisor-franchisee relationship is governed by contracts and trust. This paper analyzes how 
formal (contracts) and relational (trust) governance mechanisms affected franchisor performance 
in a service sector franchise for the period 2008¬2015. Using the SOM method in the empirical 
analysis, the results revealed that trust-based governance was more prominent than contract-
based governance in the multi-unit franchise network and the cross-franchising network, nega-
tively affecting franchisor performance in the multi-unit franchise network and positively affecting 
franchisor performance in the cross-franchising network. In contrast, contracts were more promi-
nent than trust in single-unit franchising, negatively affecting franchisor performance. The primary 
practical implication is that the franchisor should prevent franchisees in the MUF network from 
opening new outlets in the same city and competing for the existing outlet’s customers.
Introduction
The literature generally addresses contracts and co-
operation separately rather than considering them 
together within an integrated framework. Yet, an 
emerging academic debate is questioning whether 
trust-based relational governance can complement or 
substitute contract-based formal governance (Herz, 
Hutzinger, Seferagic, & Windsperger, 2016). Some 
authors view these two governance mechanisms as 
complementary, with each one compensating for the 
limitations of the other (Cavusgil, Deligonul, & Zhang, 
2004; Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Luo, 2002; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). Other researchers, however, view these 
two mechanisms as substitutes for one another (Adler, 
2001; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gu-
lati, 1995; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Wang, Yeung, 
& Zhang, 2011). 
In franchising, the contract is the basic mechanism 
used to govern the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
(Hussain & Windsperger, 2013; Mumdziev & Wind-
sperger, 2011; Windsperger, 2004). In addition to the 
contract, trust is also used as a governance mechanism 
(Griessmair, Hussain, & Windsperger, 2014; Gorovaia 
& Windsperger, 2013) Although these two governance 
mechanisms are used alongside one another, there is 
little research into how contracts and trust affect each 
other (Hendrikse, Hippmann, & Windsperger, 2015) 
and how they jointly influence franchisor performance 
(Herz et al., 2016). Hendrikse et al. (2015) state the 
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general trust of the franchisor reduce the franchisor’s 
perception of relational risk and hence the necessity to 
control the network relationships by more complete 
contract planning, and knowledge-based trust in-
creases information sharing between the partners and 
hence the knowledge base for specifying more detailed 
contracts. Herz et al. (2016) state the trust is a facilita-
tor of decentralization in franchise networks, thereby 
increasing the positive performance effect of decision 
rights delegation. It therefore remains unclear how the 
exchange structure (i.e., the contract) and the process 
(i.e., trust) relate to one other and how this relationship 
affects franchising performance. In order to contribute 
theoretically to the debate discussed in the previous 
paragraph, this paper focuses on how contract and 
trust jointly influence franchisor performance into one 
franchise network with different sub-networks.
Franchises, interpreted as organizational networks, 
organize their franchisees into networks. Regard-
less of whether a franchise has dual distribution, 
the franchise network may be divided into different 
sub-networks (referred to in this paper as franchisee 
networks). Single-unit franchising (SUF), multi-unit 
franchising (MUF), cross-franchising, and fran-
chising by franchisee-investors who hand over the 
running of their outlets to other franchisees are the 
franchisee networks considered in this research. The 
mechanisms governing these networks are contracts 
and trust. Contracts govern SUF networks, while con-
tracts and trust govern MUF, cross-franchising, and 
franchisee-investor networks. 
The prediction of company failure is one of the 
main concerns that the manager of every company 
must address. In the case of a franchisor, its financial 
performance depends on the solvency of its franchi-
see networks. The franchisor can also affect the finan-
cial performance and sustainability of its franchisees 
through the governance mechanisms that control the 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee. Ac-
cordingly, this paper analyzes the impact of formal 
(contracts) and relational (trust) governance mecha-
nisms on franchisor performance. In order to achieve 
this aim, an empirical analysis of quantitative data 
for 113 franchised outlets of a Spanish service sector 
franchise between 2008 and 2015 has been carried 
out. A neural network algorithm yielded findings that 
advance the theory relating to the aforementioned 
debate. The findings confirm some of the key propos-
als of the relational versus formal governance debate. 
These proposals are corroborated for different fran-
chise network structures. First, in cross-franchising, 
trust-based relational governance positively affects 
franchisor performance. Second, in MUF networks, 
relational governance negatively affects franchisor 
performance. Third, when the contractual clauses 
fail to adjust to franchisees’ circumstances in SUF 
networks, formal governance through contracts nega-
tively affects franchisor performance. The findings 
also contradict other theories such as agency theory, 
which advocates subjecting franchisees to governance 
mechanisms to stop opportunistic behavior from 
harming franchisor performance. 
The value of this work is to simultaneously analyze 
the contract and trust in a franchise chain where its 
franchisees are organized in different networks such 
as SUF, MUF, and cross-franchising, and how these 
mechanisms affect the financial performance of the 
franchisor. The findings of this study can help fran-
chisors decide on the right combination of gover-
nance mechanisms to expand their brands within the 
home market while achieving optimal performance. 
Improving franchised outlets’ governance contributes 
to consolidating the franchise as a source of entre-
preneurship and creator of employment. Moreover, 
franchisors could assess the financial situation of its 
franchisees in an easy and visual way, summarizing 
a high amount of information in a single visual rep-
resentation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. Sec-
tion 3 describes the sample and variables and explains 
the methodology: the self-organizing maps approach 
(SOM). Section 4 presents and discusses the results 
of the SOM analysis. Finally, Section 5 sets forth the 
conclusions, managerial implications, and limitations.
The franchise: A modern 
organizational network
The franchise, understood as a hybrid organizational 
form (Williamson, 1991), can be thought of as an orga-
nizational network. This interpretation illustrates and 
captures the dynamic nature of new corporate forms in 
the context of today’s global economy (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005). Franchising provides a useful labo-
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ratory for testing business ideas and complex organiza-
tional network processes within which these ideas and 
processes are embedded (Shane, 1996).
Franchises must have ways of controlling their fran-
chisees, a difficult task given that the franchisor must 
choose between several ownership strategies within 
the franchise (Griessmair et al., 2014). Franchisors can 
exploit the same retail markets using the same business 
concepts by opening both franchised and company-
owned outlets, or by opening franchised outlets only. 
Company-owned outlets may be pilot outlets or 
formerly franchised outlets that the franchisor has 
since bought. Pilot outlets are used during the fran-
chise’s early years while the franchisor tests the busi-
ness idea. Once the franchise matures, the franchisor 
purchases the profitable franchised outlets, convert-
ing them into company-owned outlets. Franchisors 
may decide to build different types of networks with 
their franchisees: single-unit franchising (SUF), 
multi-unit franchising (MUF), and cross-franchising 
networks. SUF refers to the “one franchisee, one out-
let” format, whereas MUF refers the format whereby 
franchisors assign multiple outlets to each of their 
franchisees (Jindal, 2011). Cross-franchising refers to 
situations whereby franchisees operate two or more 
outlets with at least one of these outlets belonging to 
a different franchise brand. While franchisors often 
require franchisees to sell their products exclusively 
(i.e., SUF), many franchisors allow their franchisees 
to sell competing brand lines in their stores (i.e., 
cross-franchising) (Rajab, Kraus, & Wieseke, 2013). 
With cross-franchising, the franchisor strives to get 
franchisees and retailers to promote his or her brand 
to customers. According to Grünhagen and Mittels-
taedt (2005), franchisors may opt for MUF when 1) 
they need franchisees to work developing markets 
and these franchisees enter a market because they 
view the franchise as an investment rather than an 
entrepreneurship opportunity and 2) franchisees run 
several outlets belonging to the same chain as an op-
portunity for personal development and entrepre-
neurship. Finally, a franchisor may have some fran-
chisees who are investors with establishments run by 
other franchisees.
Franchisors use only formal mechanisms to govern 
SUF networks, whereas with MUF, cross-franchising, 
and franchisee-investor networks, they use both for-
mal and informal governance mechanisms. The fran-
chisor chooses the most efficient governance mecha-
nism based on the franchise network’s performance.
Trust and contracts are viewed as two important 
mechanisms to safeguard against opportunistic behav-
ior and maintain cooperation (Jap & Ganesan, 2000), 
although other governance mechanisms exist (Rajab et 
al., 2013, p. 446). Trust and contracts tend to reduce 
goal incongruence and preference divergences among 
business partners, and they are widely acknowledged 
as essential to inter-firm collaboration (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1989).
Formal governance mechanism: The franchise 
agreement
Contracts are legal agreements between two or more 
business partners. They establish the legal and insti-
tutional framework and specify the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of each party in a relationship (Luo, 
2002). An effective contract prescribes suitable behav-
ior by partners in the relationship, as well as protocols 
for distributing outcomes and penalties for violating 
the terms of the agreement. 
Well-written contracts indicate how to handle any 
situation that may arise (Lusch & Brown, 1996). They 
reduce uncertainty regarding potential outcomes 
and the behavior of the parties and establish formal 
rules and procedures to govern the relationship. Con-
tracts thereby limit the domain and severity of risk to 
which the parties of an exchange expose themselves 
to, while encouraging ongoing cooperation (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). 
Contracts are a mechanism for resolving conflicts 
arising during knowledge transfer. When a dispute 
arises, the pertinent clause in the contract determines 
the legal obligations of the parties (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1994). Contracts thus reduce costs and risks associated 
with knowledge exchange and collaboration during 
the relationship.
Contracts positively affect relationship perfor-
mance, but the effect over the course of the collabora-
tive process is nonlinear (Wang et al., 2011). When a 
contract is excessively detailed, it becomes rigid and 
inflexible, causing monitoring costs to rise. Further-
more, an excessively detailed contract may hinder 
the exchange of information between the parties of 
the contract in a limited area because the contract 
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explicitly states what is and is not permitted. Using 
highly detailed contracts in a relationship may impede 
knowledge transfer (particularly tacit knowledge), pre-
vent collaboration between parties, and may even send 
out signals of mistrust (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). An 
overly detailed contract is therefore just as harmful as 
a contract that lacks detail (Wang et al., 2011). After a 
certain point, any additional detail in the contract may 
be detrimental to the relationship between the parties.
The same principles apply to the franchise agree-
ment, which governs the franchisor-franchisee rela-
tionship. In SUF networks, the contract is in fact the 
only governance mechanism. An effective franchise 
contract prevents opportunistic behavior by both par-
ties through clearly expressed clauses and enables the 
transfer of explicit knowledge (know-how) from fran-
chisor to franchisee and the flow of tacit knowledge 
(market knowledge) from franchisee to franchisor. 
Consequently, the contract improves the performance 
of the franchise outlet and the franchisor. 
In MUF and cross-franchising networks, the con-
tract plays an important role in governing these net-
works, but trust also acts as a governance mechanism. 
In all cases, franchisors demonstrate a certain degree 
of trust in their franchisees. In MUF networks, fran-
chisors show faith in their franchisees by letting them 
open new outlets. Similarly, in cross-franchising net-
works, franchisors show faith in their franchisees by 
letting them work concurrently with other franchise 
brands, thereby exposing themselves to the risk that 
these franchisees spend more of their time and effort 
on competing brands. Finally, franchisors also place 
their trust in franchisee-investors by letting them hand 
over the running of their outlets to other franchisees. 
Relational governance mechanism: Franchisors’ 
trust in franchisees
Trust can be studied from both sides of the franchi-
sor-franchisee relationship—from the perspective of 
the franchisee’s trust in the franchisor (Grace, Frazer, 
Weaven, & Dant, 2016) and from the perspective of 
the franchisor’s trust in the franchisee. In this research, 
trust is considered from the perspective of the fran-
chisor’s trust in the franchisee. From this perspective, 
trust is an important informal governance mechanism 
that leads to higher relational rents owing to savings 
in transaction costs and/or an increase in transaction 
value (Griessmair et al., 2014). Trust represents the ex-
tent to which a firm believes that its exchange partner 
is honest and/or benevolent (Geysken, Steenkamp, & 
Kumar, 1998).
A positive experience with a franchisee during the 
contractual relationship signals high credibility and 
fairness, thereby increasing the franchisee’s reputa-
tion and hence the franchisor’s trust in each franchisee 
network. When franchisors have positive experiences 
with franchisees, they have a high level of trust in their 
partners and are more likely to select them to become 
multi-unit franchisees. In this case, the franchisor uses 
the offer of MUF as a reward strategy to screen fran-
chisees based on their credibility and fairness in prior 
interactions. Therefore, the franchisee’s reputation 
provides information for the franchisor’s selection of 
new MUF franchisees (Gillis, McEwan, Crook, & Mi-
chael, 2011). According to Griessmair et al. (2014) this 
form of trust is known as knowledge-based trust.
General trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) can 
also apply to the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
(Griessmair et al., 2014). Under given exchange haz-
ards, a high level of general trust means the franchisor 
perceives lower relational risk and hence faces lower 
agency and monitoring costs. These lower risks and 
lower costs mean that the franchisor is less likely to 
control the franchisees. This situation is compatible 
with the substitutability of formal and relational gover-
nance in inter-firm cooperation (Cavusgil et al., 2004; 
Gulati, 1995; Macaulay, 1963; Nooteboom, Berger, & 
Noorderhaven, 1997; Wang et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, a franchisor with a high level of gen-
eral trust and knowledge-based trust will tend to build 
MUF networks (Griessmair et al., 2014) and even 
cross-franchising networks. With cross-franchising 
networks, the franchisor’s knowledge-based trust leads 
the franchisor to believe that the franchisee’s positive 
experience with another brand can be transferred to 
the franchisor’s brand. Furthermore, general trust 
leads franchisors to perceive zero or very low agency 
and monitoring costs related to the governance of 
franchisees working with another brand. Hence, with 
MUF networks, the franchisor’s general trust coupled 
with the positive experience the franchisor has of man-
aging his or her franchisees (knowledge-based trust) 
means that the franchisor grants franchisees licenses 
to run new franchise outlets. Finally, franchisors with 
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a high level of general trust and a low or non-existent 
level of knowledge-based trust will tend to build fran-
chisee-investor networks whereby investors hand over 
the running of their outlets to other franchisees.
As previously discussed, the franchisor’s level of 
general trust positively affects franchisees who open 
additional outlets with different franchisors. Con-
versely, any franchisor who uses purely contract-based 
governance with franchisees who work with more than 
one franchise brand is exposed to the risk of losing the 
trust of these franchisees (Quinn & Doherty, 2000). 
Franchisors should therefore refrain from using coer-
cive tactics to influence franchisees because such ap-
proaches harm the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
(Tikoo, 2002; 2005).
Environmental uncertainty must not be overlooked 
in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. Under high 
uncertainty pressure, the effect of trust and contracts 
on business performance may vary (Wang et al., 2011). 
In a context of uncertainty, it is more difficult to pre-
dict and provide for all eventualities. Even though 
the contract may provide for certain outcomes in the 
future, these provisions alone are insufficient to en-
sure the contract adapts to the changing environment 
throughout the course of the relationship (Luo, 2002).
In a turbulent environment, therefore, trust may 
offer way of overcoming the disadvantages of an in-
flexible contract-based governance mechanism. Dyer 
and Singh (1998) argue that as a self-enforcing safe-
guard, the presence of trust between business partners 
based on mutual commitment and shared values is 
more effective and less costly than creating a contract. 
Trust provides the flexibility to cope with inevitable 
uncertainties that arise in a long-term exchange. This 
flexibility helps mitigate exchange hazards under un-
certainty and strengthens bilateral commitment to 
exchange-specific investments (Luo, 2002). Just as 
contracts affect relationship performance, the trust 
between business partners directly affects relationship 
performance (Liu et al., 2009) and financial perfor-
mance (Laaksonen, Jarimo, & Kulmala, 2009).
Method, sample and variables
Method
To achieve the aforementioned research aims, the em-
pirical study examined the financial behavior of fran-
chisees operating outlets of a beauty industry franchise 
in the Spanish market between 2008 and 2015. 
From an important franchisor, the empirical data 
from a sample of 113 franchisees were collected. By 
means of a Self-Organizing Map (SOM), an unsu-
pervised training algorithm belonging to the artificial 
neural networks, we create a bi-dimensional map of 
franchisees based on the franchisees’ financial state-
ments. In this map, franchisees with the same financial 
situation will be placed close allowing the identifica-
tion of different groups or clusters of franchisees. This 
first analysis can help the franchisor to identify which 
franchisees display financial problems or which are the 
most solvent. Thus, a high volume of information is 
summarized in a visual way. Then, once the clusters 
had been detected, we assessed how the different gov-
ernance mechanisms applied by No+Vello are present 
in each of the previous established groups.
Self-organizing map (SOM)
Neural networks (NNs) represent one of the most 
widely used groups of models among all intelligence 
techniques. NNs have mathematical and algorithmic 
elements that mimic the biological neural networks of 
the human nervous system. NNs thus share similari-
ties with the functioning of the human brain (Koho-
nen, 1990). NNs represent a powerful set of algorithms 
to find behavioral patterns (Moreno & Olmeda, 2007). 
Furthermore, they require no assumptions about the 
statistical distribution of the data, and they are not 
subject to the limitations of linear specifications, un-
like many traditional techniques. NNs have been used 
extensively in business, management, marketing, pro-
duction, and finance, among other fields. For example, 
NNs have been used to measure countries’ invest-
ment risk, forecast market movements, detect failures 
of firms, and compute credit scores (Baesens, Gestel, 
Stepanova, Van den Poel, & Vanthienen, 2005; Becer-
ra-Fernandez, Zanakis, & Walczak, 2002; Falavigna, 
2012; Huang, Nakamori, & Wang, 2005). The powerful 
pattern classification capabilities applications of NNs 
made us to consider this approach in the paper where 
the previous applications in the franchising literature, 
however, are scarce.
An SOM is a kind of neural network. It is a non-
supervised network that requires training. The net-
work learns in an unsupervised way because there is 
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no objective output. The network on its own discovers 
common patterns among the inputs. An SOM uses 
unsupervised competitive learning to form a nonlin-
ear projection of a dataset in a reduced space while 
maintaining the original topology of the input space. 
One of the main advantages of SOMs is that they 
reduce the dimension of the original dataset to a bi-
dimensional map in which the spatial configuration 
is closely linked to the statistical properties of the da-
taset. This means that regions that are close together 
in the SOM represent data that are very similar to one 
another in the original dataset. The converse is also 
true. Regions that are far apart from one another in 
the SOM represent data that differ greatly in the origi-
nal dataset.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of an 
SOM. It can be viewed as a two-dimensional grid in 
which each cell in the input and output space array has 
a processing unit, called a neuron. Neurons of the in-
put layer are connected to all the neurons of the output 
layer through synaptic weights. Consequently, the in-
formation provided by each neuron in the input layer 
is transmitted to all the neurons in the output layer. All 
the neurons in the output layer receive the same set of 
inputs from the input layer.
The objective of a competitive network like an SOM 
is to find the neuron in the output layer with the most 
similar synaptic weights to the values of the input layer 
neurons. To do so, each neuron calculates the differ-
ence between the input pattern and the set of synaptic 
weights of each output neuron. The winning neuron is 
the one with the smallest Euclidean distance between 
its weights and the set of inputs. The Euclidean dis-
tance is not the only measure to calculate the distance, 
but it is the most metric. The Euclidean distance be-
tween the neurons of the output layer and the vector of 
input patterns is calculated thus:









Figure 1. Graphical Representation of SOM
Source: Adapted from “The self-organizing map”, by Kohonen (1990). In Procceding of the Institute of Electrical and Electron-
ics Engineers (IEEE) Knowledge and Data Engineering Exchange, 78, 1464-1480.
Figure 1 
  




Source: Adapted from “The self-organizing map”, by Kohonen (1990). In Procceding of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Knowledge and Data Engineering 
Exchange, 78, 1464-1480. 
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where kX  is the input of the k-input neuron and , ,( )i j td  
is the Euclidean distance of the (i,j) neuron in t cor-
responding to the input pattern for a network with i x j 
neurons in the output layer and k neurons in the input 
layer. The winning neuron is the one with the shortest 
Euclidean distance.
After determining the winning neuron, all neurons 
in the network receive an output equal to 0, except 
the winning neuron, which receives an output equal 
to 1. The weights of the winning neuron are later 
adjusted with a learning rule to proxy these weights 
to the input pattern that made the neuron win. The 
neuron whose weights are closest to the input pat-
tern is thus updated so that the weights become even 
closer. The winning neuron is therefore more likely 
to win the competition in the next data entry if the 
input vector is similar, yet it is less likely to win if the 
input vector is different. Hence, the neuron becomes 
specialized in this input pattern. 
The following equation proxies the weights of 
the wining neuron and the neighborhood function 
neurons:
( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , ,1    .  ( )j i k j i k k j i kW t W t X t W t+ = + ∝ −
where α is the learning ratio, ( )kX t  is the input pattern 
in t and , , ( )j i kW t  is the synaptic weight that connects 
the k input with the neuron (j,i) in t. The neighbor-
hood function makes it possible to update the weights 
of the winning neuron and the neighbor neurons to 
localize similar patterns too. The neighborhood radius 
decreases with the number of iterations of the model to 
achieve a better specialization of each neuron. 
The SOM model converges according to Glady-
shev’s theorem (Lo, Yu, & Bavarian, 1993). At the end 
of the training process, the SOM makes it possible to 
visualize the multivariate dataset in a two-dimensional 
graph, helping researchers infer topological relation-
ships in the original dataset.
The model
The SOM Toolbox for MATLAB (Vesanto, Himberg, 
Alhoniemi, & Parhankangas, 2000) was used to train 
the SOM where the input data is the financial informa-
tion for each of the different franchisees. Some param-
eters must be defined when training an SOM. Setting 
the size of the map or the number of units or neurons 
in the SOM is important. A common rule of thumb 
in the SOM Toolbox defines the number of units in 
the map as 5√N, where N is the number of observa-
tions in the dataset. Accordingly, the map in this study 
consisted of 54 units. We used a hexagonal grid sheet 
structure with the following default ratio for the side 
lengths: √(λ_1 ⁄ λ_2), where λ_1and λ_2 are the two 
largest eigenvalues of the autocorrelation matrix. The 
map units are connected to neighboring units on the 
grid by a Gaussian neighborhood function.
The data were normalized using logistic normal-
ization (Pyle, 1999). Scaling the variables is especially 
important in SOM because the algorithm uses the 
Euclidean distance to measure the distances between 
vectors.  
After it has been trained, the SOM creates a set of 
prototypes in a two-dimensional grid representing the 
original data. The SOM preserves the original topol-
ogy, reducing data complexity. The aforementioned 
map with 54 units is then clustered into several groups 
of neurons with similar prototypes or low distances 
among the neurons. Detecting groups in the map 
helps assess patterns among the franchisees belonging 
to each group. The clustering process of the SOM can 
be performed quantitatively using a clustering tech-
nique taking into consideration the codebook or the 
final weights once the map has been trained. We used 
the K-means algorithm to cluster our trained map. K-
means is one of the most well-known unsupervised 
algorithms because it is robust and easy to implement. 
Nevertheless, K-means requires the desired number 
of clusters to be established beforehand. We therefore 
ran the K-means algorithm nine times, setting the de-
sired number of clusters each time to a different inte-
ger from 2 to 10. The Davies-Bouldin index (Davies 
& Bouldin, 1979) provided an indication of the best 
solution. The Davies-Bouldin index is a function of 
the ratio of within cluster variation to between cluster 
variation. The smaller the Davies-Bouldin index, the 
better the partition. 
Sample and variables
This section provides an overview of the franchisor 
and the franchisee networks used in this paper. This 
section also describes the financial variables related to 
franchised outlets and the fees established in the fran-
chise agreement.
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The franchisor and franchisee networks: Data 
sample
The sector analyzed in this study is the Spanish beauty 
industry. A franchisor in this sector was chosen for 
three reasons. First, the franchisor uses both formal 
governance mechanisms (i.e., a contract) and a com-
bination of formal and relational (i.e., trust) gover-
nance mechanisms because of the variety of franchisee 
networks within the franchise. Second, availability of 
financial data was good, with financial data available 
for 51.60% of the franchisees in the network. This con-
stitutes a good sample size considering that the avail-
ability of financial data is one of the main limitations 
when the unit of analysis is the franchisee. Third, the 
chosen franchisor runs a major national and interna-
tional franchise in the beauty sector. No+Vello is the 
world leader in intense pulsed light (IPL) treatments. 
The brand started in Spain in 2007 and registered as a 
franchise in 2008. No+Vello is now present in 13 coun-
tries and has more than 1,000 outlets. Spain has more 
outlets than any other country (219). 
At the time of the study, the franchise had the fol-
lowing franchisee networks: an SUF network with 154 
franchisees who ran only one outlet; an MUF network 
with 60 franchisees who ran more than one outlet each, 
2 of whom ran outlets for other brands from the fash-
ion and sport sector; a cross-franchising network with 
5 No+Vello franchisees who concurrently ran other 
franchised outlets for other brands from the fashion, 
hospitality, sport, and beauty sectors; and, finally, 1 
franchisee who handed over the running of his or her 
3 outlets to another No+Vello franchisee. According to 
the CEO of the brand, the latter case was exceptional. 
The situation arose because of the trust between the 
franchisees in question. The franchisee who handed 
over the running of his or her outlets was a franchisee-
investor who lacked the time to run the outlets. This 
franchisee therefore requested assistance from another 
No+Vello franchisee, whom the franchisee trusted, to 
run the three outlets. The franchisee-investor payed a 
monthly fee to the franchisee in charge of running the 
outlets. The franchisor had no company-owned out-
lets, so we were unable to analyze the effectiveness of 
the dual distribution. 
The franchisor applies only formal governance 
mechanisms to the SUF network, whereas both formal 
and relational governance mechanisms are applied to 
the MUF, cross-franchising, and franchisee-investor 
networks. The sample comprised 113 franchisees be-
longing to the aforementioned franchisee networks. 
The sample was chosen based on the availability of 
financial and contractual data for the franchised out-
lets. The SABI database provided the financial data, 
while the franchisor provided the contractual data. 
All 113 outlets were operating in Spain under formal 
and relational governance mechanisms. The franchise 
had franchised outlets in other countries, but no such 
outlets were included in the sample. Therefore, in ad-
dition to applying formal governance mechanisms, the 
franchise may also use relational mechanisms. This 
is because the specific know-how of the franchisor is 
tacit, so the franchise contract is incomplete, forcing 
the franchisor to delegate decision rights to the fran-
chisee on account of the intangibility of the franchi-
sor’s know-how.
Description of financial and contractual variables
The literature offers different methods of calculating 
performance (Kacker, Dant, Ermerson, & Couglan, 
2016). In this study, seven financial ratios were cal-
culated using the data available for 113 franchisees 
between 2008 and 2015. Although the database iden-
tification numbers were available for other No+Vello 
franchisees, the financial data were not. Many franchi-
sees are self-employed, so they are not obliged to file 
their financial statements with the regulatory authori-
ties. Table 1 gives a description of the most common 
ratios used in the literature to profile a company’s fi-
nances and predict bankruptcies. 
In addition to the financial data obtained from the 
SABI database, contractual data regarding franchisees 
was gathered from the franchisor (see Table 2). The 
additional data consisted of the following variables: 
initial investment, franchise fee, royalties, advertising 
fees, franchised outlet age, and province. 
Half of the initial investment may be financed by 
the franchisor. The franchisee must return the amount 
within three years. The royalties for use of the brand, 
technical assistance, marketing, and training is a fixed 
amount that does not vary with sales. This amount has 
been updated regularly since 2014. Because the fran-
chisor demands a fixed amount in royalties, he or she 
does not seem to safeguard against potential oppor-
tunistic behavior by franchisees. This feature suggests 
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that the franchisor has general trust in the franchisees 
and that the contract is in some sense inflexible. The 
year that each outlet opened provides an indication of 
how old the outlet is and how well established in the 
marketplace it is. Table 3 presents the results of a pre-
liminary descriptive analysis of the financial ratios for 
the sample to identify any anomalies in the data. 
Discussion of results
Figure 2 shows the SOM and the clusters resulting 
from the K-means cluster analysis. As per the values 
for the Davies-Bouldin index, the optimal number of 
franchisee groups was three. These groups were la-
belled from 1 to 3 according to the financial profile of 
the franchisees in each group. Group 1 comprised the 
Variable Description
Earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) / financial expenses
Measures the franchisee’s ability to make a profit. High ratios indicate greater solvency, 
taking into account the franchisee’s debt structure.
Financial expenses / 
total assets
Measures the franchisee’s level of debt. High values indicate high debt levels or high 
financing costs.
Equity / total assets
Measures the franchisee’s leverage. High values indicate that most assets belong to the 
franchisee, not the creditors.
Cash and liquid assets / 
total assets
Measures the franchisee’s ability to make short-term payment commitments.
Sales / current assets Measures the franchisee’s ability to generate sales revenues.
Return on total assets (%) 
(ROA).
Measures the ability of the assets of the franchisee’s business to generate income for 
themselves.
Return on equity (%) 
(ROE).
Measures the return on the franchisee’s own funds or the ability of the franchisee’s 
business to repay the franchisee for any investment made.
Table 1. Financial Variables of Franchisees
Variable Definition
Initial investment Initial amount paid by the franchisee to the franchisor to open a franchised outlet.
Franchise fee The fixed up-front fee paid by the franchisee to the franchisor.
Royalties The revenues paid in royalties by the franchisee to the franchisor.
Advertising fees % paid for advertising campaigns led by the franchisor.
Franchised outlet age Difference between the year of the financial statements and the date the outlet was opened.
Province The Spanish province where the franchisee operates.
Table 2. Contractual Variables of No+Vello’s Franchisees
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Source: Compiled using own data 
 







EBIT / Financial expenses -7.94 20.07 -109.82 25.01 -52.91 -8.46 -0.78 1.54 9.28
Financial expenses / 
Total assets
0.02 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
Equity / Total assets -0.55 2.77 -18.14 0.96 -2.34 -0.30 0.05 0.27 0.54
Cash and liquid assets / 
Total assets
0.18 0.19 0.00 0.86 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.26 0.59
Sales / Current assets 8.33 9.17 0.26 55.75 0.62 3.15 4.63 10.45 28.08
Return on total assets (%) 
(ROA)
-0.27 102 -7.92 1.73 -1.05 -0.20 -0.02 0.02 0.15
Return on equity (ROE) 
(%)
-6.27 15.49 -109.90 8.89 -40.03 -5.32 -0.07 0.15 2.08
Table 3. Descriptive Analysis
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most solvent franchisees, whereas Group 3 comprised 
the franchisees in the weakest economic situation. This 
classification was based on the average values of the 
ratios for the franchisees in each group.
Table 4 shows the same mean values as in Figure 2. 
Table 4 also presents the results of the ANOVA, which 
was conducted to identify differences between clus-
ters in terms of the mean values of the financial ra-
tios. All ratios, except financial expenses/total assets 
(p-value  >  0.05), were significantly different across 
groups for alpha = 0.05.
To better describe the characteristics of each group, 
Figure 3 shows the component planes (or heat maps). 
These maps show the values of one variable in each 
map unit. Blue colors represent low values, and red 
colors represent high values of the ratios. These maps 
visually represent the main characteristics of the 
groups. Moreover, by comparing the pattern of shaded 
map cells in each map, it is possible to analyze the rela-
tionships between variables.
Comparing the cells representing Group 1 in Figure 
2 (i.e., the right-hand cells of the map) with the cells 
in the component planes yielded information regard-
ing the characteristics of franchisees in Group 1. For 
instance, franchisees in Group 1 had high values for 
the ratios EBIT to financial expenses, equity to total as-
sets, ROA, and ROE. This group of franchisees had the 
most profitable businesses. This group of franchisees 
also had good liquidity in terms of the ratio of cash 
and liquid assets to total assets. This group comprised 
22.13% of the franchisees in the sample.
The cells representing Group 2 (i.e., the left-hand 
cells of the map) had lower values than the cells repre-
senting Group 1 for the aforementioned ratios in Table 
4. One of the main differences among the three groups 
in Table 4 can be found in the financial expenses to 
total assets ratio. Franchisees in Group 2 had high lev-
els of debt, which consumes a considerable amount of 
their businesses’ total revenue. This group comprised 
57.52% of the sample.
Finally, the franchisees in Group 3 had solvency 
problems. Some franchisees in Group 3 had negative 
net profits, high levels of debt, and poor liquidity. De-
spite these problems, franchisees in Group 3 had high 
sales to current assets ratios. This ratio measures the 
efficiency with which the franchisees use their assets 
to generate sales revenue. Businesses with low profit 
margins often have high values for this ratio usually 
because of strong price competition. This group com-
prised 20.35% of the sample.
As it can be seen, SOM provides a useful tool for 
a franchisor in order to assess in the solvency or the 
performance of its franchisees in a visual way. After 
analyzing the financial behavior of the franchisees, 
we analyzed whether the patterns we observed were 
linked to any one of the franchise networks described 
in the method section. Table 5 shows that most SUF 
franchisees were in Group 2. High debt was the main 
characteristic of these franchisees. Franchisees in the 
MUF network, however, were in the worst financial sit-
uation (Group 3). Franchisees in the cross-franchising 
network had the best financial profile (Group 1).
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 F-Stat P-value
EBIT / Financial expenses -1.38 0.07 -37.72 72.52 0.00
Financial expenses / Total assets 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.25 0.29
Equity / Total assets -0.48 -0.07 -1.99 4.30 0.02
Cash + liquid assets / Total assets 0.46 0.08 0.15 99.33 0.00
Sales / Current assets 4.28 9.44 9.60 3.27 0.04
Return on total assets (%) (ROA) 0.01 -0.02 -1.26 17.88 0.00
Return on equity (%) (ROE) -1.07 -0.58 -28.03 56.89 0.00
Table 4. Average Values in Ratios and ANOVA Analysis by Group
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To analyze the effect of governance mechanisms 
on franchisees’ financial performance, we calculated 
the means of each contractual variable for each group 
of franchisees (see Table 6) and for each type of net-
work (see Table 7). According to the data in Table 6, 
the age of the franchised outlet seems to determine 
which group each franchisee belongs to. The longer 
franchisees had been operating franchised outlets, the 
healthier their financial profile. 
Table 7 shows that the age of the franchised outlet 
also determines which network the franchisee belongs 
to. Franchisees in the SUF network had the franchised 
outlets that had been operating for longest. The SUF 
network is the most traditional and most common 
type of franchise network. The franchisor started with 
this franchisee network before building other fran-
chisee networks governed by relational governance 
mechanisms. SUF franchisees had, on average, made 
the greatest initial investment and paid the highest ad-
vertising fees. The contractual differences between the 
SUF and MUF networks were small, the only differ-
ence being in terms of royalties, which were higher in 
the MUF network.
The greatest differences were observed for the cross-
franchising network. The franchisor seems to impose 
less rigorous contract demands than those imposed 
upon franchisees in the other two franchisee networks. 
The fixed up-front fee was omitted from Table 7 be-
cause, unlike the other fees, it did not change between 
2008 and 2015.
The time frame of the study (2008–2015) spanned 
the period during which the effects of the global eco-
nomic downturn were causing widespread uncertainty 
in markets around the world (see Tables 8 and 9). Be-
tween 2008 and 2009, most franchisees fell into Group 
2. Franchisees in Group 2 (SUF) had large debt levels. 
At that time, these franchisees had not yet been able 
to recover the large investments demanded by the 
franchisor because the franchise had only just been 
established. Only 14.29% of the franchisees were in the 
weakest group. Over the next four years, however, the 
effects of the economic crisis in Spain saw many fran-
chisees move from Group 1 (mainly cross franchising) 
to Group 2 in 2010 and 2011. The economic situation 
for the franchisees worsened in 2012 and 2013, with 
the proportion of franchisees in Group 3 reaching its 
Figure 3. SOM by Variables
Figure 3 




Source: Compiled using own data 
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Group T \ Group T+1 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Group 1 73.68% 21.05% 5.26%
Group 2 2.04% 89.80% 8.16%
Group 3 12.50% 25.00% 62.50%
Table 9.  Matrix of Migration between Groups
Group/Period 2008–2009 2010–2011 2012–2013 2014–2015
Group 1 35.71% 17.24% 18.92% 26.67%
Group 2 50.00% 72.41% 54.05% 46.67%
Group 3 14.29% 10.34% 27.03% 26.67%






Advertising fee  
(€)
Franchisee outlet age 
(years)
SUF 12617.65 330.67 2013.76 5.28
MUF 10757.14 346.13 2001.26 3.00
CROSS-FRANCHISING 6900.00 331.58 1608.00 2.50
Table 7. Contractual Data by Type of Franchise Network
Group Initial investment (€) Royalties (€) Franchise fee (€) Franchisee outlet age (years)
1 12715.38 330.00 1907.32 5.40
2 9600.00 343.86 1931.84 3.20
3 10304.35 342.16 2208.17 2.52
Table 6. Contractual Variables by Franchisee Group
Network Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
SUF 19.12% 70.59% 10.29%
MUF 22.86% 34.29% 42.86%
CROSS-FRANCHISING 40.00% 50.00% 10.00%
Table 5. Franchisees’ Financial Profile by Franchise Network
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peak (27.03%). Between 2014 and 2015, the economic 
situation improved, and the number of franchisees in 
Groups 1 and 2 rose accordingly. At this time, the fran-
chisor updated some of the financial clauses applicable 
to the franchisees.
Table 9 shows the results of a complementary analy-
sis. The table provides a matrix of migration among 
groups. This table indicates one-year group migration 
probabilities based upon available data. For example, a 
franchisee in Group 1 had a 21.05% chance of moving 
to Group 2 after one year, whereas 73.69% of the fran-
chisees in Group 1 remained in the same group the next 
year. Group 2 was the most stable group, with 89.80% of 
franchisees remaining in that group. The percentage of 
franchisees remaining in Group 3 was 62.50%. 
We also analyzed whether competition between 
franchisees located in the same province could have 
affected the franchisees’ financial profile (see Table 10). 
Madrid accounted for almost a quarter of No+Vello’s 
franchised outlets. The next most populous provinces 
in terms of number of No+Vello franchised outlets 
were Gerona, the Balearic Islands, Seville, and Barce-
lona, although all of these provinces had considerably 
fewer outlets than Madrid. Girona had the highest 
proportion of profitable outlets, and Madrid had the 
lowest. In some provinces such as Almeria, Gipuzkoa, 
and Tenerife, all outlets were profitable. In contrast, all 
outlets were financially weak in Malaga, Cadiz, and Las 
Palmas. Nevertheless, the location of the franchisees 
did not appear to determine their financial profile.
Each of the sampled franchisees had one of three 
financial profiles, summarized below.   
1. The franchisees with greatest solvency, profitabil-
ity, and liquidity mostly belonged to the cross-
franchising network, although some belonged to 
the SUF network. The analysis revealed that these 
Province Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Almeria 4 0 0
Badajoz 0 4 1
Barcelona 5 0 5
Cadiz 0 1 5
Ciudad Real 0 6 0
Girona 3 10 1
Gipuzkoa 3 0 0
Huelva 0 2 1
Balearic Islands 0 12 0
Las Palmas 0 0 1
Madrid 3 16 7
Malaga 0 0 2
Tenerife 5 0 0
Seville 2 9 0
Zaragoza 0 5 0
Total 25 65 23
Table 10. Geographical Distribution of Franchisees by Group
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franchisees were efficient because they had the 
lowest employee cost as a percentage of operating 
revenues. Franchisees from the cross-franchising 
network were the newest members of the franchise 
and those who paid the smallest initial investment, 
royalties, and advertising fees. Although the small 
number of franchisees in Group 1 with just one 
outlet (SUF) paid more in initial investment, roy-
alties, and advertising fees, by the time the study 
took place, they had had enough time to recover 
their investment and thus establish their businesses 
in the marketplace. They were located mainly in 
coastal provinces.
2. The franchisees with the highest debt levels were 
mostly in the SUF network. These franchise hold-
ers had been with the franchise less time than the 
other franchisees and had been required to pay 
the highest amounts in initial investment and ad-
vertising fees without recovering the investment. 
Franchisees in Group 2 were located in both inland 
and coastal provinces. This profile became more 
prevalent between 2010 and 2011 among franchi-
sees who had previously run profitable operations. 
Franchisees in this group were the least likely to 
improve or worsen financially.
3. The franchisees with the lowest levels of solvency, 
profitability, and liquidity belonged to the MUF 
network. Large provinces had a high proportion 
of outlets in such a situation. The main differen-
tiating characteristic of the franchisees with this 
profile was a high degree of efficiency in the use of 
assets to generate sales revenues. This efficiency is 
common among retail businesses because of heavy 
price competition, which leads to high volume and 
low margins. These were the most likely franchi-
sees to improve their financial situation. 
Conclusions, practical implications, 
and limitations of the study
The right application of contract-based governance 
mechanisms and/or trust-based governance mecha-
nisms affects franchisee performance and conse-
quently franchisor performance. A self-organizing 
map (SOM) visually classified franchisees into three 
groups. This classification is potentially highly useful 
for franchisors. Having many franchisees in the finan-
cially weakest group may damage the franchisor’s sol-
vency and future profitability. The franchisor can use 
this information to establish a governance policy with 
each franchisee to guarantee steady growth for both 
franchisor and franchisee.
The main conclusions are as follows. Franchisees 
in the MUF network were the least profitable. The fi-
nancial behavior of these franchise holders negatively 
affected franchisor performance. Opening a second 
outlet soon after the first gave the franchisee insuf-
ficient time to become familiar with the brand and 
market, acquire experience, and establish the business. 
The franchisor had an excess of knowledge-based trust 
in MUF franchisees. When deciding whether to let 
a franchisee open a new outlet, the franchisor based 
his or her decision on knowledge acquired at the time 
the franchisee was originally selected. The franchisor 
failed to continue gathering knowledge about the fran-
chisee as the relationship developed. Consistent with 
Gillis et al.’s (2011) findings, franchisees’ reputations 
provide basic information to help franchisors assign 
new outlets to franchisees. These findings may coun-
teract franchisors’ tendency toward MUF based solely 
on the positive influence of knowledge-based trust in 
franchisees (Griessmair et al., 2014). 
Franchise holders in the cross-franchising network 
had the best financial behavior, exerting a positive 
influence on franchisor performance. The franchi-
sor’s trust as an informal governance mechanism led 
to this financial behavior by franchise holders in the 
cross-franchising network. These franchisees were the 
least controlled by formal mechanisms (i.e., contracts) 
because the franchise agreement demanded a smaller 
investment than that required of other franchisees. 
Among these franchisees, general trust had a greater 
weight than knowledge-based trust because they had 
been operating franchised outlets for the shortest time, 
yet they had been allowed to open outlets with another 
brand despite the moral hazard involved.
Finally, most SUF franchisees ran financially inef-
ficient outlets, thereby negatively affecting franchi-
sor performance. The use of a contract as the only 
mechanism of formal governance applied by the fran-
chisor to govern the relationship led to this financial 
behavior by SUF franchisees. The franchisor failed to 
make the financial clauses of the SUF agreement flex-
ible enough and did not update the clauses when the 
economic context changed. The franchisor seems not 
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to have modified the contract in accordance with the 
franchisees’ environment despite the recent period of 
economic uncertainty in Spain. Using the contract as 
the only governance mechanism does not positively 
affect the franchisees’ performance—and consequent-
ly franchisor performance—unless the contract is 
tailored to each franchisee’s situation. Hence, a con-
tract alone is insufficient to make franchised outlets 
in an SUF network profitable. An SUF network would 
be profitable, however, if some relational governance 
mechanism were applied to foster the relationship and 
were tailored to the situation of each franchisee. Fi-
nally, environmental uncertainty affected the financial 
behavior of the franchisees and thus of the franchi-
sor; the location of the outlets, their size, and the local 
weather did not.
These conclusions have general implications for 
franchisors with franchisees spread across several 
franchisee networks. The SOM method trained a mod-
el that allows the franchisor to predict the financial 
behavior of potential franchisees based on the profiles 
described in this paper, thereby minimizing the scope 
for error when selecting franchisees. Franchisors can 
visually analyze the financial status of their franchi-
sees and make the contract more flexible, modifying 
clauses to adapt to each franchisee’s situation. Franchi-
sors can thus choose whether to use contracts or trust 
(or a combination) as the governance mechanism de-
pending on any potential franchisee’s profile. The main 
practical implications of the study are as follows. The 
franchisor should prevent franchisees in the MUF net-
work from opening new outlets in the same city and 
competing for the existing outlet’s customers. Because 
the same franchisee operates both outlets, he or she 
has no incentive to act aggressively and gain market 
share. In addition, the franchisor should not let MUF 
franchisees open new outlets simply because their ex-
isting outlets are profitable. It is also advisable to have 
a good knowledge of other personal characteristics of 
the franchisee. 
This study has limitations. The first limitation con-
cerns the data source used to gather the financial data 
on the franchisees, who are organized into several dif-
ferent franchisee networks. For instance, we encoun-
tered difficulties in gathering financial data for fran-
chisee-investors who do not operate their own outlets. 
Furthermore, many franchisees were self-employed, 
so they were not required to file their financial state-
ments with the regulatory authorities. Second, the 
study examined only one franchisor’s relationship with 
franchisees. The study could be enriched by consider-
ing another franchisor-franchisee relationship in a dif-
ferent sector. This limitation nonetheless presents an 
opportunity for further research.
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